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Article 6

RECENT DECISIONS
Separation of Powers-CONGRESSIONAL ACQUIESCENCE TO EXECUTIVE DISCRETION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Supreme Court of the United States has often struggled
with the question of the scope and nature of the President's power
over foreign affairs. This question is most pertinent when a private
citizen's rights are sacrificed for foreign affairs considerations.
Two recent cases, Hazg v. Agee I and Dames & Moore v. Regan,2
indicate how much power the President has assumed over foreign
affairs. In both cases, a citizen's rights had been infringed by presidential action. In each case, the Supreme Court held that the Executive Branch had sufficiently broad powers over foreign affairs to
justify its actions.
This note examines past court holdings in the foreign affairs
area which have established the analytical method applied by the
Supreme Court to such questions. The notes then explores how this
analysis applies to Haig v. Agee and Dames & Moore v. Regan. Finally,
guidelines are suggested for deciding future cases where the President's exercise of authority over foreign affairs infringes upon the
rights of a private citizen.
I.

Historical Background

In determining the bounds of presidential authority, the
Supreme Court has followed the analytical method suggested by Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer.3 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Jackson outlined three categories of interaction between the President and Congress when determining the scope of
4
presidential authority:
(1) when the President acts pursuant to express or implied authorization from Congress, wide judicial interpretation and strong
presumptions of validity follow executive action. 5
(2) When the President acts in absence of congressional authorization, he enters a "zone of twilight" where the Court considers all
1 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
2 453 U.S. 654 (1981).

3 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
4 Id at 634 (Jackson J., concurring).
5 Id at 635.
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circumstances, including congressional silence and inertia. 6
(3) When the President acts in opposition to Congress, the Court
7
sustains the action only by disabling Congress in that area.
In determining presidential authority over foreign affairs in the
face of congressional silence (Jackson's twilight zone) the Supreme
Court developed a test in Kent v. Dulles and Zemel v. Rusk (KentZemel).8 Essentially, the Kent-Zemel test looked at whether Congress had acquiesced, by its silence, in a consistent administrative
practice. Congressional silence under this circumstance was viewed as
an implied authorization of the exercise called into question.
II.

Haig v. Agee

In Haig v. Agee, the Supreme Court expanded the Kent-Zemel
test to allow a broader exercise of presidential authority in the foreign affairs area. Haig involved an ex-CIA agent, Phillip Agee, who
allegedly began a campaign to expose undercover CIA agents and
hamper the CIA wherever and whenever possible. 9 This campaign
violated an express contract between Agee and the CIA, prejudiced
American intelligence gathering ability, and encouraged violence
against the disclosed agents. 10 Great Britain, France and Holland
each deported Agee due to this campaign."1
The Secretary of State revoked Agee's passport in December
1979 pursuant to an administrative regulation derived from the 1926
6 Id at 637.
7 Id
8 The Kent-Zemel test arises from the Supreme Court's decisions in Kent v. Dulles (357
U.S. 116 (1958)) and Zemel v. Rusk. 381 U.S. 1 (1965). In Kent, the Court held that the
Secretary of State did not possess the power to refuse passports to former communists. The
Court reasoned that the 1926 Passport Act contained an implied congressional authorization
for passport refusals under circumstances where a consistent administrative practice had
arisen. However, the 1926 Act had not delegated the authority to revoke passports for membership in the communist party because the practice of denying passports for that reason was
so infrequent that Congress had not been put on notice. The Court in Kent narrowly construed the congressional delegation of power because the fifth amendment freedom to travel
was involved. In Zemet, however, the Supreme Court allowed the Secretary of State to impose
a restriction on travel to Cuba. Looking at the Secretary of State's imposition of area-wide
restrictions both before and after the 1926 Passport Act, the Court concluded that the practice was substantial and consistent enough to impute congressional authority by acquiescence.
Taken together, Kent and Zemel established the test for an implied grant of congressional
authority to the President in foreign affairs. Before Haig v. Agee, the test was limited to
executive practice. The Kent - Zemel test is now expanded to executivepoligv.
9 Haig, 453 U.S. at 283.
10 Id at 284-85.
11 Id at 283 n.1.
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Passport Act.1 2 The revocation notice13 explained the reasons for the
passport revocation and Agee's right to an administrative hearing on
the revocation's validity. Agee, however, immediately sued the Secretary of State in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. Agee contested the passport revocation on the grounds
that the regulation which authorized the-revocation was outside the
congressional delegation of authority and that the regulation's appli4
cation violated Agee's Constitutional rights.'
12

22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1976) (The 1926 Passport Act).
AUTHORITY TO GRANT, ISSUE, AND VERIFY PASSPORTS

The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports, and cause passports to
be granted, issued, and verified in foreign countries by diplomatic representatives of
the United States, and by such consul generals, consuls, or vice consuls when in
charge, as the Secretary of State may designate, and by the chief or other executive
officer of the insular possessions of the United States, under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States, and no
other person shall grant, issue, or verify such passports. Unless authorized by law, a
passport may not be designated as restricted for travel to or for use in any country
other than a country with which the United States is at war, where armed hostilities are in progress, or where there is imminent danger to the public health or the
physical safety of United States travellers. July 3, 1926, c 772, § 1, 44 Stat. 887;
Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. 95-426, Title I, § 124, 92 Stat. 971.
22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1979): 51.70 Denil/ofpassporls (b) A passport may be refused in any
case in which: . . . (4) The Secretary determines that the national's activities abroad are
causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of
the United States . . . .22 C.F.R. § 51.71(a): 51.71 Revocation or Restriction ofPassports A passport may be revoked, restricted or limited where: (a) The national would not be entitled to
issuance of a new passport under § 51.70.
13 The December 23, 1979 notice read (in part):
The Department's action is predicated upon a determination made by the Secretary under the provisions of [22 C.F.R.] Section 51.70(b)(4) that your activities
abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or
the foreign policy of the United States. The reasons for the Secretary's determination are, in summary, as follows: Since the early 1970's it has been your stated
intention to conduct a continuous campaign to disrupt the intelligence operations
of the United States. In carrying out that campaign you have traveled in various
countries (including, among others, Mexico, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Jamaica, Cuba, and Germany), and your activities in those countries have caused
serious damage to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.
Your stated intention to continue such activities threatens additional damage of the
same kind."
453 U.S. at 286.
14 Agee actually contested the passport revocation on five grounds:
He alleged that the regulation invoked by the Secretary, 33 C.F.R. § 41.70(b)(4)
(1980), has not been authorized by Congress and is invalid; that the regulation is
impermissibly overbroad; that the revocation prior to a hearing violated his Fifth
Amendment right to procedural due process; and that the revocation violated a
Fifth Amendment liberty interest in a right to travel and a First Amendment right
to criticize government policies.
453 U.S. at 287.
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The District Court' 5 granted Agee's motion for summary judgment because the 1926 Passport Act did not authorize the Secretary
of State to revoke passports for national security reasons.' 6 The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 7 affirmed. Both lower courts interpreted the Kent-Zemel test to require a
substantial and consistent administrative practice in order to imply
authorization from Congressional silence.' 8 The few instances of
passport refusals for national security reasons' 9 did not constitute a
sufficient practice to imply congressional approval of presidential authority to revoke passports for national security reasons.
The United States Supreme Court, 20 reversing the lower courts,
found implied congressional authorization for the Secretary.of State's
revocation of passports for national security reasons. 2' In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger cited Kent v. Dulles22 and Zemel v.
Rusk 23 for the rule that congressional silence in response to a longstanding administrativepoli,, showed implied congressional authorization through acquiescence. 24 The Court reasoned that the
President should not be faulted merely for having had few opportu25
nities available to exercise his policy.
With this decision, the Supreme Court rejected the lower courts'
analysis that the Kent-Zemel test requires a substantial administrative
practice. Nor did the Court choose to expand the concept of substan15

Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1980).

16 Id at 732.
17 Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
18 629 F.2d at 87; 483 F. Supp. at 732.
19 Although the district court considered only the one prior passport revocation under 22
d.F.R. § 51.70(b) (4) (483 F. Supp. at 731), the circuit court considered the two passport refusals before the 1926 Passport Act and the three passport refusals during the 1950's. 629 F.2d at
86.
20 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
21 id at 290.
22 357 U.S. 116 (1958). Discussed at note 13 supra.
23 381 U.S. 1 (1965). Discussed at note 13 supra.
24 453 U.S. at 303.
25 Chief Justice Burger wrote:
[I]f there were no occasions-or few-to call the Secretary's authority into
play, the absence of frequent instances of enforcement is wholly irrelevant. The
exercise of a power emerges only in relation to a factual situation, and the continued validity of the power is not diluted simply because there is no need to use it.
The Secretary has construed and applied his regulations consistently, and it
would be anomalous to fault the Government because there were so few occasions
to exercise the announced policy and practice. Although a pattern of actual enforcement is one indicator of Executive policy, it suffices that the Executive has
'openly asserted' the power at issue.
453 U.S. at 302.
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tial practice to include a consistant policy coupled with a few actual
applications.2 6 Rather, the Court relied upon dicta from cases which
27
indicated that a consistentpoliy, standing alone, is sufficient to imply authorization from congressional silence.
The majority dismissed Agee's argument that his passport revocation violated his first amendment freedom of speech and his fifth
amendment right to travel. The Court found that the passport revocation inhibited Agee's disclosure of confidential information rather
than his right of free speech.28 The Court also distinguished between
interstate and international travel, affirming that Agee's international
travel can be regulated without violation of the fifth amendment due
process clause.2 9 The national security and foreign policy considerations involved outweighed Agee's right to international travel with a
United States passport.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan narrowly construed the KentZemel test as requiring a substantial and consistent practice before
finding a congressional delegation of authority. 30 He commented on
the majority's "whirlwind" treatment of Agee's Constitutional
claims, ' 3 1 stating that a consistent administrative policy is insufficient notice to imply congressional authority in "an area fraught
with important Constitutional rights."'32 Justice Brennan felt that revoking Agee's passport impinged a first amendment right, but the
governmental interest in national security may have outweighed
33
Agee's right of free speech in this particular instance.
Haig v. Agee illustrates the Court's reluctance to undermine an
executive policy when Congress did not limit the extent of executive
power and did not expressly object to its application. Due to this
reluctance, the Court extended the Kent-Zemel test. Henceforth, cases
falling within Justice Jackson's second category require only a consis26 Judge MacKinnon, dissenting from the court of appeals decision, (629 F.2d at 87),
chose this view. The Supreme Court could easily have agreed with MacKinnon that a substantial practice existed in this case and need not have expanded the Kent-Zemetl test.

27 Kent, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Zemel, 381 U.S.1 (1965); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1
(1965); Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. U.S., 288 U.S. 294 (1933); Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287
U.S. 341. See Haig, 453 U.S. at 300.
28 453 U.S. at 308. The Court even questioned whether the first amendment protections
applied outside the United States.
29 Id at 306, [citing Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176 (1978)].
30 Id at 318.
31 Id at 320 n.10.
32 Id at 318.
33 Id at 320 n.10.
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tent administrative policy, rather than practice, to be upheld as
within the presidential authority.
III.

Dames & Moore v. Regan

In Dames & Moore v. Regan ,'34 the Supreme Court held that the
President has broad powers during a national emergency to settle
private claims against a foreign country through executive agreement. Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
[IEEPA],35 the President can freeze a foreign country's assets, transfer those assets from the United States and nullify any previously
licensed attachments against those assets.3 6 The President can also
suspend private claims before United States courts unless Congress
37
disapproves.
On November 4, 1979, Iranian students seized American diplomats and personnel stationed at the American Embassy in Tehran.3 8
The Iranian government supported the capture and threatened to
withdraw its assets from the United States. 39 President Carter thereafter declared a national emergency under the IEEPA. 40 He froze all
Iranian assets in the United States, prohibited prejudgment attachment on those assets unless licensed by the Treasury Department and
prevented entry of any final judgment affecting the frozen Iranian
41
assets.
In December, an American firm, Dames & Moore, sued Iran
over a contract dispute.4 2 The District Court issued prejudgment at34 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
35 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et. seq, (1976).
36 453 U.S. at 675.
37 Id at 686.
38 N.Y. Times, May 17, 1981, (Magazine (Special Issue)), at 55-58.
39 Id
40 Exec. Order No. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65729 (1979). The declaration of national emergency is required by the IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a). The national emergency must involve
an "unusual and extraordinary threat . . . to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. . ." Id
41 Exec. Order No. 12170,44 Fed. Reg. 65729 (1979) (blocking Iranian assets); 31 C.F.R.
§ 535.203(e) (1979) (prohibiting any judicial process unless licensed); 31 C.F.R. § 535.805
(1979) (making any license granted revocable); 31 C.F.R. § 535.504(a) (1979) (granting a
general license for certain judicial proceedings but prohibiting entry of final judgment); 31
C.F.R. § 535.418 (1979) (clarifying that license for prejudgment attachment had been
granted).
42 Dames & Moore filed suit in United States District Court for the Central District of
California against the Government of Iran, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
and several Iranian banks. Dames & Moore had contracted to perform a site survey for a
proposed nuclear power plant in Iran. The AEOI terminated the contract as provided by the
contract. Dames & Moore sued on the contract for the value of services performed before
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tachment orders, subject to the Treasury Department's license,
43
against Iranian property located within the United States.
In January 1981, the President negotiated an agreement that
private claims would be settled by an Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in
return for release of the American hostages. 44 The President revoked
the previously granted prejudgment licenses, nullified any interests in
the Iranian assets and ordered the frozen Iranian assets transferred to
a federal reserve bank.45 Subsequently, the District Court granted
summary judgment to Dames & Moore, but dissolved the prejudgment attachment and stayed execution of the judgment pending
appeal.

46

Once the President suspended all private claims before United
States federal courts in favor of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 47 Dames & Moore filed a separate suit against the Secretary of
the Treasury to prevent implementation of the executive orders. The
District Court granted an injunction and the Supreme Court granted
48
a direct appeal on an expedited schedule.
The United States Supreme Court found explicit congressional
authorization in the IEEPA which enabled the President to freeze
Iranian assets, transfer those assets out of the United States and nullify any judicial attachments taken against the frozen Iranian assets. 49 Although the Court viewed the IEEPA as restricting the
President's emergency power over a foreign country's assets during
peacetime, 50 it held that the President did possess the powers exercised. The IEEPA's plain language clearly gave the President autermination. Complaint in Dames & Moore v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, No. 7904918 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
43 453 U.S. at 666.
44 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria,
Jan. 19, 1981, United States-Iran. 20 INT'L L. MATERIALS 224 (1981); Declaration of the
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria concerning the Settlement
of Claims by the United States and Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, 20 INT'L L. MATERIALS 230 (1981).
45 Exec. Order No. 12276-12285, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913-1792 (1981).
46 453 U.S. at 666.
47 Exec. Order No. 12294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111 (1981).
48 453 U.S. at 667.
49 Id at 675. The relevant section of the IEEPA enables the President to:
investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, transportation, importation or exercising any right, power or privilege with
respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national
thereof has any interest; by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (1976).
50 See H.R. Rep. No. 45, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977). See generaly, Note, Presidential
Emergency Powers relatedto InternationalEconomic Transactions: CongressionalRecognitionof Customa9
Authority, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 515 (1979).
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thority to dispose of frozen foreign assets. 5 1 Also, the congressional
purpose in enacting the IEEPA was to create a "bargaining chip" for
negotiation. 52 Permitting private attachments would severely hamper the President's use of this bargaining chip.
Since the executive orders were established pursuant to explicit
.congressional authority -

Justice Jackson's first category -

they

were supported by the "strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation and the burden would rest heavily
upon any who might attack it."' 53 If the executive orders were unconstitutional, it would mean that "the Federal Government as a whole
'54
lacked the power exercised by the Pregident.
The suspension of private claims before United States federal
courts presented a more difficult question.55 The Supreme Court did
not find explicit congressional authorization for the suspension of private claims against Iran in the two congressional acts they considered. The IEEPA was rejected because it deals with rights exercised
against a foreign country's assets, not personal claims meant to establish liability and fix damages. 56 The 1968 Hostages Act also provided insufficient authority because it was enacted to provide a direct
remedy against a foreign country which repatriated Americans
57
travelling abroad.
The failure to find specific congressional authorization for the
suspension of private claims required the Court to decide whether
the President had such authority either independently or with the
implied approval of Congress. Although the Supreme Court has determined that the President has some independent constitutional
power over foreign affairs, 58 the extent of that power has not been
51 See note 36 supra.
52 453 U.S. at 673.
53 Id at 674, (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637
(1952) (Jackson J., concurring)).
54 Id
55 Exec. Order No. 12294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111.
56 453 U.S. at 675.
57 Hostages Act of 1868, 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976). "The President shall use such means,
not amounting to war, as he may think necessary and proper to effectuate the release" of
Americans deprived of liberty by any foreign government.
58 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 304 (1926); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942). These cases hold the President has independent constitutional power to execute private claims settlements incident to the recognition of a foreign country. See also, Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Affairs Law of the United States § 205 (1975); M. WHITMAN,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 247 (1970).
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fixed. 59
In Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court again recognized some
independent presidential power over foreign affairs. 60 The Court,
however, found implicit congressional approval "crucial" to its decision. 6 1 The Court did not emphasize the "plenary and exclusive
power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in
the field of international relations - a power which does not require
as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress. ' 62 The Court rejected
the reasoning that the President has "inherent power, at least in
times of international crisis, to settle the claims of United States na'63
tionals against a foreign government.
Instead, the Supreme Court chose the more flexible approach
indicated by Justice Jackson's tri-partite classification of presidential
power.64 The President's suspension of private claims fell into Justice
Jackson's second category where Congress has neither explicitly approved nor disapproved of the presidential action. 65 Writing for the
court, Justice Rehnquist explored the history of executive claims settlements and concluded that Congress had acquiesced to these
ccmeasures taken on independent presidential responsibility. '66 Congress knew about and facilitated the "long standing practice of settling such claims by executive agreement without the advice and
67
consent of Congress."
Dames & Moore asserted that Congress had not acquiesced to
the President's authority to settle private claims by executive agreement. Rather, Congress had enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) to remove the President's authority to make case by
case determinations of sovereign immunity. 68 Dames & Moore argued that the FSIA's grant of exclusive jurisdiction over private
claims to federal courts implied that the President could not settle
59 See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS & THE CONSTITUTION 176 (1972); F. WEISBAND,
FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 135 (1979).

60 See generay, L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITION 179 (1972).
61 453 U.S. at 661.
62 Id, quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 299 U.S. 304, 319-320
(1926).
63 Chas. T. Main Int'l v. Khuzetan Water & Power Co. 651 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1981).
64 453 U.S. at 661.
65 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (Jackson J., concurring).
66 453 U.S. at 678, quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637
(Jackson J., concurring).
67 Id at 679.
68 453 U.S. at 685.
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those claims by executive agreement. 69
The Court decided that, when the FSIA was enacted, Congress
merely intended to remove the sovereign immunity barrier from private claims against a foreign country. The Court required more direct congressional opposition to the presidential action to negate
implied congressional approval.
The Supreme Court also found that the statutes in the foreign
affairs area evinced a congressional desire to leave broad discretion
with the President.70 Congress considered, but did not enact, legislation which would have greatly reduced the presidential power to
make executive agreements or limit the agreements' effect. 7 1 The legislation enacted only requires the President to send the text of executive agreements to Congress. 72 The Court also noted that Congress
had not objected to this executive agreement with Iran, further but73
tressing its finding of congressional approval.
In Dames &Moore, the Supreme Court indicated that it will hold
executive claims settlements unconstitutional only when the settlements directly contradict congressional acts. The Court views the
foreign affairs power as shared between the President and Congress,
except for the small area of exclusive power each derives from specific
constitutional grant. In applying Justice Jackson's second category,
however, the Court leaves broad discretion with the President for the
conduct of foreign affairs.
IV.

The Significance of Agee and Dames & Moore

The underlying issue in both Agee and Dames & Moore is the
scope of the President's executive power to limit the rights of U.S.
citizens when exercise of their rights affect foreign affairs. How far
may the Executive branch go before it oversteps congressional and
69 See generally, Note, The ForeignSovereign Immunities Act of 1976. Giving the PlaintilfHis
Day in Court, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (1977).
70 Id at 677. The Supreme Court looked primarily at the IEEPA and the 1868 Hostage
Act.
71 See Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements, Hearings on S. 632 and S. 1251
before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 1st Sess., 243-261, 302-311 (1975); Congressional Review of International Agreements: Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of
the House Committee on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 167, 246 (1976). Congress has been moving generally toward more control over foreign policy. See generally, Note,
NationalEmergengy Dilemma: Balancingthe Executives CrisisPowers with the Need/or Accountability,
52 S. CALIF. L. REv. 1453 (1979).
72 1 U.S.C. § 112(b) (1976).
73 453 U.S. at 687.
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constitutional limitations? 74 These two cases stand for the proposition that absent clear congressional disapproval, the Supreme Court
will uphold executive decisions concerning foreign affairs.
While the Constitution establishes few specific power grants to
the President concerning foreign affairs, 75 it does vest him with executive power. 76 Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton insisted
that the grant of executive power expressly vested the President with
all authority over foreign affairs except for those specifically withheld. 77 Despite this historical backdrop, a more limited view has
emerged. 78 Today, the President's executive authority lies somewhere between a grant in bulk, as Hamilton characterized it, and the
few clauses provided by the Constitution. An exact demarcation line
still remains to be drawn, even after the Agee and Dames & Moore
79
decision.
If the congressional role in foreign affairs was more clearly defined, the scope of executive authority in foreign affairs could be ascertained. Congress, however, has no clearcut territory. The
Constitution states that the President and the Congress share concurrent power in foreign affairs.8 0 The President and Congress interact
when making and executing foreign policy. The President makes
general foreign policy by acting as the "sole organ of the federal gov74 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 399 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) and L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-2 (1978).
75 Article 2, § 2 provides that the President "shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy,. . . shall have the Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties," subject such treaties to the Senate and "appoint Ambassadors and other
Public Ministers."
76 U.S. Const., Article 2, § 1.
77 See 5 T. JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 162 (Ford ed. 1892) and 7 A. HAMILTON, WORKS 81
(Hamilton ed. 1851). Both men reasoned that while the Constitution gave Congress all legislative power "herein granted" in Article 1, Article 2 simply states "the executive power shall
be vested in the President." The President therefore, has no limitation other than those specifically stated.
78 See Youngstown Sheet and Tubing Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) "I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all conceivable
executive power, but regard it as an allocation to the presidential office of the generic powers
thereafter stated."
79 See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 660. "Our decision today will not dramatically alter
this situation for the Framers 'did not make the judiciary the overseer of our government'."
(quoting Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 594 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
80 Article I § 8 provides that Congress has power to "lay and collect. . .Duties, Imports
and Excise;. . .regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations;. . .define and punish. . .Felonies committed on the high seas and Offenses against the Law of Nations; . . . declare war;
. . . raise and support Armies; . . . provide and maintain a Navy." Article 2 § 2 requires
congressional advice and consent in treaty making and ambassador appointments. For presidential powers see note 75 s'upra.
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ernment in the field of international relations." 81 Congress makes
foreign policy as well by regulating commerce, declaring and waging
war, authorizing executive agreements, and issuing resolutions on na82
tional policy related to its war power.
The President executes foreign policy by entering into executive
agreements and negotiating treaties.8 3 Congress also executes foreign
84
policy by implementing legislation and appropriating funds.
As Dames &Moore points out, the separation and interaction between the two branches in governing our Republic has been the focal
point of countless commentaries, with few definitive results. 85 The
Court, quoting Justice Jackson, remarked, "[A] judge . . .may be
surprised by the poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority
applicable to concrete problems of executive authority as they actu86
ally present themselves.1
While the President predominates in foreign affairs, his power
ultimately derives from congressional delegation and constitutional
grants. 87 The President cannot invade Congress' legislative power
unless Congress delegates its power to him.8 8 Once delegated, Congress retains the power to limit the executive authority.8 9 In both
Agee and Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court's chief inquiry was
whether the President had acted beyond the limits set by Congress. 90
Dames &Moore posed an easier problem to the Court than Agee.
In Dames & Moore, the Court found that since 1799 the Executive
branch had repeatedly exercised authority to settle claims by U.S.
nationals against foreign countries. 9 1 Despite numerous legislative
enactments in this area, Congress had not limited this executive authority.9 2 To reflect the general tenor of Congress concerning the
81

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).

82
83

Se L. HENKEN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 89 (1972).
See note 75 sura.
See L. HENKEN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 89 (1972).

84

85 453 U.S. at 660.
86 Id
87 See Youngstown, at 585.
88 See Olegarzo v. United States, 629 F.2d 204 (C.A.N.Y. 1980).
89 See L. TRIBE, supra note 74, at § 4-2.
90 In Agee, "he (Agee) alleged that the regulation invoked by the Secretary, 22 C.F.R.
§ 51.70(4) (1980) has not been authorized by Congress and is invalid." 453 U.S. at 287. In
Dames &Moore, The petitioner "alleged that the actions of the President and the Secretary of
the Treasury implementing the Agreement with Iran were beyond their statutory and constitutional powers. . . ." 453 U.S. at 667. In both cases there were other claims of constitutional infringements which were either never reached (Dames & Moore, Id. at 688-89) or just
briefly touched. (Agee, 453 U.S. at 306-10).
91 453 U.S. at 680. (In note 9, the Court lists the ten most recent agreements since 1952).
92 See note 53 supra.
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scope of executive power in foreign affairs, Dames & Moore quoted
Senator Williams, draftsman of the Hostage Act of 1869: "If you purpose any remedy at all, you must vest the executive with some discretion, so that he may apply the remedy to a case as it may arise. ' 93
The Court concluded that Congress had implicitly approved private
claim settlements by executive agreement. 94 Consequently, Dames &
Moore fit, if not directly into Justice Jackson's first category, sufficiently close to it to justify upholding the executive action. 95
Agee, on the other hand, fell more directly into Justice Jackson's
"zone of twilight." Having neither express statutory language96 nor
frequent adminstrative practice, 9 7 the Court was forced to stretch the
applicable Kent-Zemel test to allow passport revocation for national
security reasons. 98 The Court recognized that Congress had delegated broad powers to the President in this important foreign affairs
area. Quoting from Zemel, the Court emphasized, "Congress, in giving the Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs, must of
necessity paint with a brush broader than it customarily weilds in
domestic areas." 99
In Agee and Dames &Moore, the Court did not define the scope
of executive authority in foreign affairs. Dames &Moore fit relatively
near Justice Jackson's first category. Under those circumstances, the
President acted with maximum power, and the Court granted him
wide discretion.10 0 Agee fit more directly into Justice Jackson's second category. But the reasoning in Agee implied that the Court will
go to some length to give the President control over foreign affairs. 101
93

453 U.S. at 677, quoting the Cong. Globe 4359, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1868).

94

453 U.S. at 680.

95 See id at 680-82. (The Court discussed the fact that executive action falls, not into
distinct pigeon-holes, but rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition. Id. at 669).

96 453 U.S. at 290.
97

Id at 302.

98

Id at 305-06.

99

Id at 292 quoting from Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).

100 See note 5, supra.
101 Two particularly pertinent quotations support this proposition. "This is especially so
in areas of foreign policy and national security where congressional silence is not to be
equated with congressional disapproval." Agee, 453 U.S. at 291. "Matters intimately related
to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention."
Id at 292.
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Taken together, the message to Congress seems plain: Absent clear
congressional disapproval, the Supreme Court will not interfere with
executive decisions when they concern foreign affairs.
William P. Hovell
Brian A. Mueller
Kirk S Schumacher

